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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered by the 
Fourth Judicial District Court on the 27th of October, 1987, 
and jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Rule 
3 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court* 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Fitzgeralds filed a complaint for slander of title to 
remove two notices of interest recorded by Corbett. Corbett 
and Gurr filed an Answer and Countercalim. The case was tried 
by the Court sitting without a jury on October 24, 1985 • 
Further hearings were heard on October 24, 1986, November 6, 
1986, and September 18, 1987* The trial court entered judgment 
removing the Notices of Interest, and denied damages to 
Fitzgeralds, since no damages were proven, and ordered 
Fitzgeralds to deliver a deed to 320 acres to Corbett and Gurr 
upon payment of $11,000.00 and to deliver deeds to five 
purchasers of properties from Corbett and Gurr* The court 
entered Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment on October 27, 1987. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Is the Settlement Agreement of September 107 1982, 
enforceable? 
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2. Were the provisions of the Settlement Agreement 
requiring Fitzgeralds to honor past sales of Corbett and Gurr 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata? 
3. Did the trial court err in failing to award 
damages for the slander of title? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Corbett and Gurr were originally partners in a 
partnership known as Utah Ranchlands (R. 221)* Utah Ranchlands 
was terminated in September 1981* Mr. Corbett, without Mr. 
Gurrfs knowledge, filed two Notices of Interest. The first 
Notice of Interest was filed November 1, 1982 (Exhibit 2) and 
the second was filed April 18, 1984 (Exhibit 3). The Notices 
of Interest covered lands owned by Lee and Helen Fitzgerald, 
(hereinafter "Fitzgeralds11), which were the subject matter of 
contracts wherein Corbett and Gurr purchased from Fitzgeralds 
(Exhibits 3 and 4). Corbett and Gurr had in turn resold some 
of the land to third parties (Exhibits 15, 16, 16A, 17, 18, 
30). 
Mr. Corbett filed the Notices to protect the 
third-party purchasers. Fitzgeralds commenced this action to 
cause Corbett to remove the Notices and for damages for slander 
and/or clouding of Fitzgeralds1 title. Corbett and Gurr 
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counterclaimed and sought performance from Fitzgeralds under an 
Agreement dated September 10, 1982, denoted as Settlement 
Agreement (Exhibits 11 and 12, R. 31-36). 
Corbett and Gurr were Plaintiffs in an earlier action 
against Lee and Helen Fitzgerald and Perry and Carolyn 
Fitzgerald in case no* 50224. The issues in 50224 were: 
a) Corbett and Gurr sought to enforce the May 
1977 Earnest Money Contract; 
b) whether the June 1978 payment on the May 1977 
contract was timely; 
c) whether the September 9177 option was timely 
exercised; 
d) whether the interest of Corbett and Gurr in 
the May 1977 contract could be terminated; 
e) what damages, if any, flowed to the respective 
parties (Exhibit 29). 
The trial court, Judge Bullock, held the May 1977 contract was 
terminated and ordered recission (May 4, 1982 Judgment, Exhibit 
10). Thereafter, on April 17, 1983, Judge Bullock amended the 
Judgment for monetary damages in favor of Carolyn and Perry 
Fitzgerald since Corbett and Gurr were incapable of returning 
the eight-plex to Perry and Carolyn Fitzgerald (Exhibit 5). 
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As part of the final argument by Lee and Helen 
Fitzgerald's counsel in 50224, Mr* Jeffs offered in open court 
that if the court would terminate the May 1977 contract, Lee 
and Helen Fitzgerald would honor all contracts of sale which 
Corbett and Gurr had entered into with innocent third party 
purchasers for the remaining balances due from the purchases, 
if any* This offer was acknowledged by Judge Bullock's ruling 
in the May 4, 1982 Judgment and the April 17, 1983 Amended 
Judgment. 
Corbett and Gurr filed three Notices of Appeal in 
50224. They were: 
a) May 17, 1982, Appeal No. 18529 (from the 
Memorandum Decision); 
b) June 29, 1982, Appeal No. 18594 (from the 
formal Judgment on the Memorandum Decision); 
c) May 17, 1983, Appeal No. 19225 (from the 
Amended Judgment of April 17, 1983). 
In response to the Settlement Agreement of September 10, 1982, 
Corbett and Gurr instructed their counsel not to oppose a 
motion to dismiss the appeals numbered 18529 and 18594 and on 
November 1, 1982, these appeals were dismissed (Exhibit 4, R. 
264-6). This Court held on November 1, 1985 in the Appeal No. 
19225 which only addressed the Amended Judgment of April 17, 
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1983 as to the appropriateness of the monetary damages in light 
of Corbett and Gurr's inability to return the eight-plex. A 
copy of the decision is in Appellants1 Addendum No. 18. 
After the litigation was concluded by the formal 
judgment on May 1982 in 50 224 and Corbett and Gurr had filed 
the second Notice of Appeal, a Settlement Agreement, dated 
September 10, 1982 was entered into by the parties (Exhibits 11 
and 12, R. 259). The Settlement Agreement required the 
following to be done: 
a) Corbett and Gurr to dismiss the appeals; 
b) Corbett and Gurr to pay approximately 
$49,000.00 (after offset of $4,700.00 judgment); 
c) Corbett and Gurr to pay $3,667.00 per year for 
three years commencing in February 1983 in exchange 
for 320 acres; 
d) Fitzgeralds would honor the sales of Corbett 
and Gurr to the third-party purchasers; 
e) Fitzgeralds would deed the 320 acres to 
Corbett and Gurr upon the payment of $11,000.00 
(Exhibits 11 and 12). 
Corbett and Gurr requested their attorney to not 
respond to Fitzgerald's motion to dismiss the appeals (18529 
and 18594), which effectuated a dismissal on November 1, 1982 
of the appeals (Exhibit 4). 
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Gurr paid the $49,000,00 payment on or before October 
4, 1982. Fitzgerald accepted the payment. Fitzgerald then 
wrote to Corbett and Gurr and asked to be advised of who had 
purchased from Corbett and Gurr so he could honor those 
contracts (Exhibits 19 and 20, R. 289-290). There are five 
contract purchasers which still have not been honored (R. 
141-2, Exhibits 15, 16, 16A, 17, 18, 30). 
Thereafter, Fitzgerald requested the payment of $3,667 
from Gurr (R. 309). Gurr wanted to pay Fitzgerald but 
Fitzgerald hadn't honored the five purchaser's contracts. Gurr 
desired to have Fitzgerald honor the contracts and pay the 
$11,000.00 all at one. and conclude the contract. Fitzgerald 
was to get back to Gurr about honoring the contracts. Gurr has 
been ready, willing, and able to pay the $11,000.00 and offered 
to do so in open court (R. 309). 
Fitzgeralds acknowledged at the beginning of the trial 
that Gurr had no responsibility for the filing of the Notices 
of Interest and that the Complaint should be dismissed as 
against Gurr (R. 221). 
Fitzgerald asserted that his title to the real 
property had been slandered and/or clouded as a result of the 
two Notices of Interest. Fitzgerald asserted that he had been 
required to incur attorneys' fees and costs in the 
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"Bell-Badger" litigation and had lost some interest on payments 
that Bell had refused to pay, but subseguently did pay. The 
admissions of Fitzgerald disclosed the "Bell-Badger" litigation 
was commenced before either of the Notices were filed and that 
Fitzgerald had settled with Mr* Bell on all issues except 
interest which ' is still pending before the Court in the 
Bell-Badger litigation (R. 337-338, 246-247). 
Corbett and Gurr in their counterclaim sought 
performance on behalf of Fitzgerald under the Settlement 
Agreement of September 10, 1982 (R. 31-37). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT OF 
SEPTEMBER 10, 1982 IS ENFORCEABLE 
A. The Settlement Agreement was executed by all 
parties. 
B. Corbett and Gurr dismissed the appeals, satisfied 
the $4,700 judgment and paid the $49,000 consideration to 
Fitzgeralds. 
C. Gurr has offered and is still willing and able to 
pay the $11,000 for the 320 acres. 
D. Fitzgeralds acknowledged the dismissals of the 
appeals and receipt of the $49,000 payment. 
-7-
E. All parties understood the terms of honoring the 
contracts to third-party purchasers. 
POINT II 
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS NOT BARRED 
BY RES JUDICATA AND/OR CLAIM PRECLUSION 
A. The issues in 50224 did not include the September 
10, 1982 Agreement since the Agreement did not come into 
existence until after the case was concluded. 
B. The open court offer by Mr. Jeffs simply defines 
the terms in the September 10, 1982 Agreement. 
C. The September 10, 1982 Agreement was attached to 
the Corbettfs Appellant Brief "for informational purposes only" 
and the issue of enforceability of the September 10, 1982 
Agreement has never been addressed by any court other than 
Judge Ballif in this proceeding. 
D. The elements for claim preclusion are not present 
in this instance, as provided in Madsen v. Borthick, 97 U.A.R. 
13 (December 12, 1988). 
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POINT III 
FITZGERALDS FAILED TO SHOW ANY DAMAGES 
AS A RESULT OF THE NOTICES OF INTEREST 
A. Fitzgeralds asserted the damages were attorney 
fees and costs incurred in the "Bell-Badger" litigation. 
B. Fitzgeralds also asserted lost interest on the 
payment due from Bell* 
C. On cross examination, Fitzgeralds admitted the 
Bell-Badger litigation was before the filing of any Notice. 
D. Fitzgeralds settled the Bell matter and reserved 
the interest issue. Bell has agreed to honor his contract and 
has made the past due payments. 
E. The litigation and the withholding of payments had 
nothing to do with the Notices. 
POINT IV 
CORBETT AND GURR ARE ENTITLED 
TO ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS FOR THIS APPEAL 
A. Under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Supreme Court provide for 
attorney fees and costs under a frivolous appeal. 
B. There is substantial, unrebutted, admissable 
evidence supporting the trial court's findings and judgment. 
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C. This appeal was perfected without "the careful 
consideration of the evidence and the law" as required under 
Backstrom Family Ltd, Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Ut* 
Ct. App. 1988), 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD 
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT TO BE ENFORCEABLE 
On September 10, 1982, Corbett & Gurr entered into the 
Settlement Agreement. Mr. Fitzgerald testified at page 287 of 
the record: 
Q And, specifically, drawing your 
attention to Exhibit No. 11—I believe it's 
the first one right there on the 
corner—does that document bear your 
signature and the signature of your wife? 
A Yes, it does, and I was present when my 
wife signed it. 
Mr. Corbett testified at pages 259 and 260: 
Q (By Mr. Brown) Mr. Corbett, was there a 
point in time in September of 1982 that an 
Agreement was entered into between you and 
Mr. Gurr and the Fitzgeralds? 
A Yes, there was. 
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Q What kind of a document is that? 
A It's a "SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT." It is 
between Lee Fitzgerald, Keith Gurr and Boyd 
Corbett. 
Part of the consideration or performance on behalf of 
Corbett and Gurr required Corbett and Gurr to dismiss the 
Appeals, and to pay approximately $49,000.00, plus $3,666.00 
per year for 3 years for 320 Acres. At page 264 Mr. Corbett 
testified: 
Q In fact, Mr. Corbett, the appeal by Mr. 
Stubbs was dismissed on your behalf, wasn't 
it? 
A Okay. At that time, yes. Yes. And, in 
fact, we dismissed our appeal to the Supreme 
Court. That's right. 
Q And subsequent to that time, did you 
know of or offer to pay the $11,000.00 as 
required in the Settlement Agreement? 
A Yes, we did. 
Again at pages 265 and 266: 
Q Did you cause a Release of Judgment to 
be made in reliance upon the Settlement 
Agreement? 
A We made a payment of $49,000.00. We 
made that payment, yes. 
. . • 
Q (By Mr. Brown) Let me show you what has 
been marked for identification purposes, 
Defendants' Exhibit No. 13, sir, and ask you 
if you can identify that? 
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A That is a "RELEASE OF JUDGMENT," which 
we gave Lee Fitzgerald when we made our 
$49,000.00 payment. 
Q I show you what has been marked Exhibit 
No. 14, and ask you if you can identify that 
document, sir? 
A Yes. This was tied in with that 
$49,000.00 payment. The payment was 
actually $54,000.00, but there was the 
$47,000.00 [sic] to our credit, leaving a 
net balance of $49,000.00 due on that same 
date. Yes. 
Mr. Jeffs cross-examined Mr. Corbett at page 284 when 
Mr. Corbett testified as follows: 
Q In fact, you paid it [the $49,000.00 
payment] on October 4th, 1982, isn't that 
correct? 
A I don't know; I cannot say. 
Q But you're not disputing that, though? 
A No. As I remember, it was not paid on 
that day, no. 
Q It was not paid on that day? 
A No. But it was paid within a time to 
conform to the underlying contract, which it 
made reference to, and Mr. Fitzgerald 
accepted the money, (emphasis supplied) 
Mr. Gurr testified at page 328: 
Q (By Mr. Brown) Did you, in fact, 
execute that Agreement, Mr. Gurr? 
A Yes. I authorized it by signing it. 
Q And when did you sign it in relationship 
to September the 10th of 1982? 
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A Well, I believe it was probably the same 
day, because Boyd, as I recall, he dropped 
by and had me sign it. 
Mr. Gurr testified about the payment of the $49,000.00 and the 
$11,000.00 at page 309 where he stated: 
Q Now, subsequent to that time [execution 
of Exhibit 11], sir, did you cause to be 
paid the payment of approximately $49,000.00 
on the DuPratt contract? 
A DuPratt contract, yes. 
Q The DuPratt payment to be made? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you have any discussion with Mr. 
Fitzgerald about the $11,000.00 for the 
payment of the annual installment of the 
thirty-six hundred and sixty-seven dollars 
for the three hundred and twenty acres? 
A I was waiting, you know, for something 
to happen on this thing. I went down to 
Lee's place several times, and I talked to 
him on the phone quite a bit, and he wanted 
to know when I was going to pay that 
three-thousand-something dollars, as I 
recall. 
Q And what did you reply? 
A I said, "Lee, what I would like to do is 
just get the whole thing settled up and pay 
you off in full on it." 
Q And what reply did he make to you? 
A It seems like he said that he would work 
on it, that he was working for some 
contracts from Corbett. 
Q Are you ready, willing and able today to 
make the $11,000.00 payment? 
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A Yes. 
The appeals were dismissed on November 1, 1982. See 
Exhibit 4. After the dismissal of the appeals, and receipt of 
the payment of $49,000.00 on October 4, 1982 in conformance 
with the Settlement Agreement, Mr. Fitzgerald wrote two 
letters, one to Corbett and Gurr and the other to Murdocks. 
These letters appear as Exhibits 19 and 20. Exhibit 20, a 
letter dated November 19, 1982 provides in part: 
Now that your appeal has been dismissed from 
the Supreme Court, I would like a list of 
all the names of those who are purchasers on 
contract of ground in Cedar Valley effected 
in this lawsuit. 
At page 341, .Mr. Fitzgerald testified as follows: 
Q (Mr. Brown) . . . Exhibit No. 20, which 
is a letter that you sent to Mr. Corbett and 
Mr. Gurr, which you have already 
acknowledged signing, is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And in that letter, and I quote you 
saying, "Now that your appeal has been 
dismissed" that was obviously one of the 
things to be done in Exhibit Nos. 11 and 12, 
isnft it? 
A Yes. Nothing could be done until it was 
dismissed. Yes. 
Q All right. And then you go on and say 
"dismissed from the Supreme Court, I would 
like a list of all the names of those who 
are purchasers on contract of ground in 
Cedar Valley effected in this lawsuit." 
Now, you wanted to get a hold of them 
immediately and honor all legitimate claims, 
is that correct? 
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A Yes. 
Q That was your intent? 
A That was my intention* 
Q Now, this, obviously, was after the 
payment had been received on October 4th of 
1982, wasn't it? 
A Yes. 
Again at page 343: 
Q And here on November the 19th, you said 
"Now that your appeal has been dismissed 
from the Supreme Court, I would like a list 
of all the names of those who are purchasers 
on contract of ground in Cedar Valley," 
correct? 
A Correct. 
Q And that is after you had received the 
so-called tardy payment, if I can use that 
term, of the $49,000.00? 
A That would be correct. 
Q Now, at that point in time you are going 
to say now, I want to honor those contracts, 
correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And that is exactly, sir, is it not, 
what Mr. Corbett has said in Exhibit No. 2, 
I believe, the Notice of Interest, that says 
to you, and the whole world, that we want 
you to honor those contracts covering those 
lands, isn't that correct? 
A Yes. 
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Fitzgerald in the Appellant's Brief makes an argument 
that the $49,000.00 payment had to be on the 10th of September, 
1982; that the time for payment was a condition precedent. 
However, Fitzgerald acknowledged that he wanted to honor the 
contracts after he received the tardy payment. 
Mr. Gurr further testified at page 311: 
Q Now, when you made the payment to Mr. 
Fitzgerald for the $49,000.00, or 
thereabouts on the DuPratt contract, did he 
object to the receipt of that payment? 
A No. 
If there was a condition precedent, that condition was waived 
by Fitzgeralds. There was ample consideration in that the 
appeals were dismissed, satisfaction of the $4,700.00 judgment 
and payment of $49,000.00 on October 4, 1982. Mr. Gurr tried 
to pay the whole $11,000.00 for the 320 acres. 
POINT II 
THE OPEN COURT OFFER WAS A KNOWN 
DEFINITION OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT PROVISION 
The Settlement Agreement of September 10, 1982 
provided in part: 
Fitzgeralds agree to honor all Corbett and 
Gurr's previous sales. 
Fitzgeralds argue, in the Appellant's Brief: 
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a* That submission of the trial transcript 
(Exhibit 9) is improper because the contract must 
contain all of the essential provisions. (Point III) 
b. That the contract provision cited above is 
clearly ambiguous (Point IV). 
Fitzgeralds admit that the Court may receive extrinsic evidence 
if the contract is ambiguous. Appellant's Brief provide in 
pertinent part: 
In the case at bar, the contract was clearly 
ambiguous as to what it meant in the 
contract to "honor all Corbett and Gurrfs 
previous sales." The Court nevertheless 
went on to order specific performance. The 
order to convey title is deficient in 
several respects: 
A. There was no evidence that Fitzgeralds 
had title to the properties which were the 
subject matter of the sales of Corbett and 
Gurr, and could convey title as ordered by 
the Court. 
B. There was an ambiguity and no 
explanation given as to who was to get the 
funds already paid to Corbett and Gurr on 
their previous sales, as they had done in 
prior contracts, as testified to by Lee 
Fitzgerald. 
C. There was no testimony on what sales the 
parties were contemplating when they signed 
the Settlement Agreement. 
D. What does "honor Corbett and Gurr's 
previous sales" mean? 
In order to enter the judgment the trial 
court had to rewrite terms into that 
Settlement Agreement that were neither set 
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forth in the Agreement itself not testified 
to by any of the parties to the action. 
The foregoing assertion is incorrect. The parties 
testified as follows: 
Mr. Fitzgerald at pages 341-342: 
Q . . . Exhibit No. 20, which is a letter 
that you sent to Mr. Corbett and Mr. Gurr, 
which you have already acknowledged signing, 
is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And in that letter, and I quote you 
saying, "Now that your appeal has been 
dismissed" that was obviously one of the 
things to be done in Exhibit Nos. 11 and 12, 
isn't it? 
A Yes. Nothing could be done until it was 
dismissed. Yes. 
Q All right. And then you go on and say 
"dismissed from the Supreme Court, I would 
like a list of all the names of those who 
are purchasers on contract of ground in 
Cedar Valley effected in this lawsuit." 
Now, you wanted to get a hold of them 
immediately and honor all legitimate claims, 
is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q That was your intent? 
A That was my intention. 
Q Now, this, obviously, was after the 
payment had been received on October 4th of 
1982, wasn't it? 
A Yes. 
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Q And at that point in time you told Mr. 
Corbett and Mr. Gurr, "I want to go forward 
and I want to honor every contract that is 
legitimate." Isn't that what you have said? 
A Not only legitimate, it had to be a 
previous contract, previous to the lawsuit, 
and it had to be an innocent bona fide 
purchaser. 
Mr. Corbett at page 251, in answer to the terms of the 
Settlement Agreement, stated: 
A Yes. Mr. Jeffs, on behalf of Mr. 
Fitzgerald, stated in open court that if 
Judge Bullock would rule in their favor, 
that they had somewhere around 27,000 acres 
of land, and that they did not want any 
innocent buyers to be hurt because of any 
decision Judge Bullock might render. And 
that this 27,000 acres was available to give 
to these innocent third party buyers. And 
this was given without any conditions, 
whatsoever. And this offer was made 
regardless of the amount paid. If they paid 
for it all, Mr. Jeffs said that they would 
get their land, regardless of the amount 
paid. 
All parties knew of the open court offer which is contained in 
Exhibit 9, which provides: 
Mr. Fitzgerald and Mrs. Fitzgerald had owned 
and purchased in excess of 27,000 acres in 
Cedar Valley for eventual development and 
sale. This lawsuit and the publicity 
surrounding it has been damaging to that 
sales effort, that development effort. We, 
Mr. and Mrs. Fitzgerald, do not want the 
persons who have bought from Corbett and 
Gurr to be hurt. And so we are suggesting 
to the Court that an eguitable verdict on 
termination would be if the Court would 
terminate Corbett and Gurr out and enter as 
a part of that termination order that Lee 
and Helen Fitzgerald honor all of the 
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contracts that Corbett and Gurr have entered 
into with innocent bona fide purchasers of 
property under that contract. And they will 
do so and they are willing to do it for the 
remaining unpaid balance. If the persons 
have paid it all and not got their title, 
he'll just give them their title for 
nothing. If they've paid all but the last 
payment, he will take the last payment and 
give them their title. So that no persons 
will be hurt as a result of the terminating 
of the Corbett and Gurr contract. They will 
all be honored, if they are bona fide 
purchasers. I'm not talking about 
contractors that like the price, I'm talking 
about bona fide purchasers of land who would 
be purchasers. 
If the Court goes the other way and enforces 
it, then you've got all of the contracts 
that Fitzgerald has entered into, and those 
people are going to get hurt. But we think 
that the eguitable remedy would be to honor 
those contracts, give the people the land 
that they bought for whatever is the 
remaining balance under the contract, and we 
are suggesting that the Court enter such an 
order as an eguitable part of the 
termination of the Corbett and Gurr May 
contract, (emphasis supplied) 
In Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah 1987) the 
Court of Appeals stated at page 551: 
It is not necessary, however, that the 
contract itself contain all the particulars 
of the agreement. The crucial factor is that 
the parties agreed on the essential elements 
of the contract. 
The receipt of Exhibit 9 was not to "make a new contract for 
the parties" but to interpret the contract, as the parties 
clearly understood the existing terms to mean. The term 
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"Fitzgeralds agree to honor all Corbett and Gurr's previous 
sales" means exactly what all parties testified to and as 
expressly stated by Fitzgerald's counsel in Exhibit 9. 
The testimony is unrebutted as to the five contracts 
of purchasers under Corbett and Gurr. They consist of: 
a. James D. and Judy R. Alvey (Exhibit 15) 
b. James E. Pratt (Exhibit 16 and 16A) 
c. Vern H. Bolinder (Exhibit 17) 
d. Dale E. Beus (Exhibit 24) 
e. Lynn N. Murdock and Nina S. Murdock (Exhibit 
30) • 
Fitzgeralds are entitled to the remaining payments on the Alvey 
contract of $17,279*91 as of September 10, 1982, together with 
interest. All other purchasers had paid in full the 
consideration for their purchases before September 10, 1982. 
Finally, For the first time, Fitzgeralds raise the 
issue on appeal that there was no evidence that Fitzgeralds had 
title to the ground. First, that's a "new" defense and cannot 
be raised on appeal for the first time. See Wheeler v. Mann, 
763 P.2d 758 (Utah 6-30-88), 86 Utah Adv. Rep. 3: 
Hence, defendant's claim is not properly 
before this Court since it may not be raised 
for the first time on appeal. Franklin Fin. 
v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 
(Utah 1983). We, therefore, decline to 
consider the argument. 
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Second, the defense of impossibility is an affirmative defense 
which must be plead or is otherwise waived under Rule 12(h) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. That Rule provides in 
pertinent part: 
A party waives all defenses and objections 
which he does not present either by motion 
as herein before provided or, if he has made 
no motion, in his answer or reply . • . 
The Reply to the Counterclaim is conspicuous by its absence of 
any affirmative defenses. 
POINT III 
THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING IS NOT RES JUDICATA 
ON THE SUBSEQUENT SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 1982 
Fitzgeralds argue that the Supreme Court ruling is res 
judicata and/or claim preclusion on the issue of specific 
performance of the Settlement Agreement (Point II). However, 
the issue of the Settlement Agreement of September 10, 1982 was 
a separate contract, not the subject matter of the litigation 
in 50224. When asked by the trial court, counsel replied: 
THE COURT: This Agreement [Exhibits 11 and 
12] is before the Supreme Court? 
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MR* BROWN: I don't think it is, your Honor. 
I think what is before the Supreme Court, 
your Honor, is what Mr. Jeffs offered in his 
Closing Arguments, if you will relative to 
having the same subject matter, if you will. 
But that is what was before the Supreme 
Court. That's the only thing that could be 
appealed. This agreement in September was 
not before Judge Bullock in Case No. 50224. 
. . . 
MR. JEFFS: And I intend to offer their 
briefs on appeal to show that it is on the 
case in the appeal, and I have Page 22 of 
their brief where it says, "After said 
dismissal, Mr. Fitzgerald refused not only 
to honor the Stipulations made in open 
court, which was subseguently refused to the 
Court's Memorandum Decision, but obviously 
omitted from the final Judgment. But he 
also refused to honor the subseguent written 
Agreements, a copy of the subseguent written 
agreement attached to this brief for 
informational purposes only." That's what 
it says in their brief. 
THE COURT: "For informational purposes 
only." I don't know that that is before 
this Court. 
Judge Bullock did not rule in 50224 whether Corbett 
and Gurr signed the Settlement Agreement; whether there was 
consideration; whether Fitzgerald's had to honor "Corbett and 
Gurr's previous sales." Those issues were decided by Judge 
Ballif in this action. Judge Bullock did not have the 
September 10, 1982 Settlement Agreement before him to rule 
upon. It didn't even exist at the time of the offer of Mr. 
% Jeffs. 
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What was before the Supreme Court in Case No* 19225, 
(District Court No. 50224), was: 
1. The enforcement of the original Earnest Money 
Agreement between Corbett-Gurr and Fitzgeralds dated 
May 1, 1977/ 
2. whether the June 1978 payment on the May 1977 
contract was timely/ 
3. whether the September 1977 option was timely 
exercised/ 
4. whether Corbett-Gurrfs interest in the May 
1977 contract was legally terminated. 
5. whether the stipulation made by Mr. Jeffs in 
open court should be made a part of the final 
judgment/ (this was specifically rejected by the trial 
court in the April 17, 1983 Amended Judgment/ 
6. whether there were damages to Corbett and 
Gurr. 
(Exhibit 29) 
The stipulation in open court which appears as Exhibit 
9 in this case is not the contract of September 10, 1982. The 
September 10, 1982 Settlement Agreement is a contract which was 
not the subject matter of the 50224 case. It could not have 
been because that contract (the Settlement Agreement of 
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September 10, 1982) was not entered into until after Judge 
Bullock had made his decision in May 1982. 
Judge Bullock did amend the Judgment on April 19, 
1983. However, he rejected the so-called offer of Mr. Jeffs. 
The offer of Mr. Jeffs was not part of either Judgment (May 4, 
1982 or April 19, 1983). The Settlement Agreement was a 
separate and distinct contract which must be performed in its 
own right independent of the May 4, 1982 or April 19, 1983 
Judgment in 50024. 
Counsel for the Appellant makes the mistake of 
construing the understanding of all parties, as manifested in 
his open court offer, to define the term "Fitzgeralds agree to 
honor all Corbett and Gurr's previous sales" as an adjudication 
on the September 10, 1982 Settlement Agreement. Such is not 
the case. The open court offer of Mr. Jeffs simply verbalizes 
the understanding of the parties of the terms contained in the 
September 10, 1982 Settlement Agreement. 
There is no dispute as to the law and the proper 
application of claim preclusion. Madsen v. Borthick, 97 U.A.R. 
13 (December 12, 1988) sets forth the applicable law and 
standard, where this Court declared at page 14: 
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action only 
if the suit in which that cause of action is 
being asserted and the prior suit satisfy 
three reguirements. First, both cases must 
involve the same parties or their privies. 
Second, the claim that is alleged to be 
barred must have been presented in the first 
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suit or must be one that could and should 
have been raised in the first action. 
Third, the first suit must have resulted in 
a final judgment on the merits* 
The second and third elements are missing in this instance. 
The enforceability of the September 10, 1982 Settlement 
Agreement was not the subject matter of the trial court nor 
could it have been without an amendment to the pleadings. No 
amendment exists. The decision of this Court in Corbett v. 
Fitzgerald, 709 P.2d 384 (Utah 1985) therefore is not a final 
judgment on the September 10, 1982 Agreement. 
POINT IV 
FITZGERALDS FAILED TO SHOW 
ANY DAMAGES ON THEIR COMPLAINT 
Mr. Fitzgerald asserted that the two "Notices of 
Interest" (Exhibit 2 and 3) filed by Mr. Corbett should be 
removed and for damages for "clouding" the title. The Court 
held the "Notices" should be removed and found that Fitzgerald 
did not prove any damages. Fitzgeralds admitted at the very 
beginning of the trial that there could not be any damages 
under any circumstances against Gurr. At page 221, Mr. Jeffs 
advised the Court: 
Our claim for damages is predicated upon the 
slander of title filed by the filing of the 
Notice of Interest. That claim is asserted 
only as against Boyd Corbett and not against 
Keith Gurr . . . . We are claiming about 
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$1,500 worth of damages against Boyd Corbett 
only. (emphasis supplied) 
Fitzgerald asserted that the damages were attorneysf 
fees incurred in the "T. H. Bell Lawsuit" and "interest lost" 
from T. H. Bell. At page 234, Mr. Fitzgerald testified: 
Q Mr. Bell was a purchaser of you of 
property covered by these same Notices of 
Interest? 
A Yes. 
Q And as a result of the lawsuit, did you 
incur expenses? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q What expenses did you incur as a result 
of that lawsuit? 
A It was about $10,000.00. 
Q And what was the expenses? What were 
those expenses? 
A They were attorney expenses and court 
expenses. 
Q In connection with that lawsuit? 
A Yes. 
Q Could you tell the Court whether or not, 
after the Notice of Interest was filed, 
whether or not Mr. Bell continued to make 
his payments under his contract? 
A No. He refused. He did make the 
payments, but he held the money back for a 
long time. 
Q As a result of that, did you incur any 
expenses? 
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A Yes, I did. 
Q What were those expenses? 
A The loss of interest on the money that 
he held back. 
Yet, it turned out that Mr. Fitzgerald settled the "Bell" case. 
At pages 246 and 247 Mr. Fitzgerald admitted: 
Q (By Mr. Brown) Mr. Fitzgerald, isn't it 
true that that case, if you will, with Mr. 
Bell, was really settled and was not ruled 
upon by the Court? The parties got together 
and settled with the exception of the 
interest factor, isn't that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And the only thing about the interest 
factor, that was tendered into court for 
further determination, is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q (By Mr. Brown) . . . Isn't it true that 
on the settlement, you knew exactly what you 
were getting out of the deal and what Mr. 
Bell was getting out of the deal? 
A Yes. I got an attorney's bill. That's 
all I got out of it. 
Q But you also got Mr. Bell to honor the 
Contract, didn't you? 
A What contract did he honor? 
Q The 1978 Contract. 
A No. It had nothing to do with him 
honoring this Contract. 
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Q It didn't have anything to do with that 
Contract? 
A Well, yes, the arguments was on the 
payments on the Contract. But he has since 
made the payments on the Contract, yes. 
Q So he is honoring the Contract? 
A Okay. Yes. 
Q And in actual fact, you accepted that 
settlement by way of compromise with Mr. 
Bell, and Mr. Bell decided to take the 
property, subject to this so-called 
encumbrance of the Notice of Interest, 
didn't he? 
A Yes, if I understand your question. 
Yes. (emphasis supplied) 
Mr. Fitzgerald then tried to get attorneys1 fees 
against Mr. Corbett for the "Notices" based upon the "Bell" 
litigation. The "Bell" litigation was commenced in 1978, 
almost four years before the recordation of the "Notices of 
Interest." Mr. Fitzgerald, under cross-examination admitted: 
Q (By Mr. Brown) Now, Mr. Fitzgerald, you 
were involved in litigation with Mr. Bell 
before that ever occurred, before the Notice 
of Interest was filed, weren't you? 
A That's what the record shows, yes. 
Q And you had litigation about other 
problems with him, independent of any Notice 
of Interest, isn't that correct? 
A It could be, yes. 
Q It "could be," or is? 
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A If the dates are right on there, it 
should be right, yes. 
Exhibit 25 is the alleged attorneys1 fees. However, Exhibit 25 
points out that the "Bell-Badger" litigation was commenced long 
before the "Notices" were filed* The litigation had nothing to 
do with the alleged slander of title as a result of the 
"Notice." There were third party complaints, answers to third 
party complaints and a number of discovery requests and 
responses all before the filing of the "Notices." Exhibit 25 
is the culmination of that litigation. The letters in Exhibit 
8 all pre-date the "Notices" except for letters, nos. 5 and 6, 
which are dated February 1983 and February 1984, but refer 
back to the Badger litigation which was before the "Notices." 
The trial court concluded at page 385: 
THE COURT: . . . it seems that the Notices 
of Interest ought to be cleared from the 
record. I can't see that there was any 
damage done there. I think that you totally 
failed on the damage proved there. But I 
think that the so-called Notice of Interest 
is not the kind that is recognized by the 
law, although I don't think there was any 
spite motivation. I think it was—it wasn't 
anything that was maliciously done. A 
slander of title, ordinarily, or something 
out of spite because of some boundary 
problem, or something like that. 
-30-
POINT V 
CORBETT AND GDRR ARE ENTITLED TO 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
On appeal, the rule of law for attorneys1 fees for a 
prevailing party, when there is no written contract for 
attorney fees is found in recent case law. The authority for 
attorney fees to be awarded against Fitzgeralds and Mr. Jeffs 
is found under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, and the cases of 
O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987), Barber v. 
The Emporium Partnership, 750 P.2d 202 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988), 
Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Ut. 
Ct. App. 1988), Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1988), and Brigham City v. Mantua Town, 754 P.2d 1230 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1988). 
Under the guidelines of Backstrom Family Ltd. 
Partnership, supra, this Court gave direction to Mr. Jeffs to 
make a decision to appeal "after careful consideration by 
counsel and client." 
Mr. Jeffs, if he doesn't know, should have known of 
the scope of review before this Court. The trial court's 
findings of fact will not be disturbed if there is sufficient 
evidence in the record to substantiate the findings. This 
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scope of review has been succinctly stated in Power Systems and 
Controls v. Keith's Electrical Construction Co,, 765 P.2d 5, 97 
U.A.R. 34 at page 36: 
The factual findings and the resulting 
judgment of the trier of fact are to remain 
undisturbed if based upon substantial, 
competent and admissible evidence. Kimball 
v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985); 
Car Doctor, Inc. v. Belmont, 635 P.2d 82, 
83-84 (Utah 1981)/ Wilburn v. Interstate 
Elec, 748 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). Factual findings are given 
considerable deference because of the trial 
court's ability to assess the witnesses' 
credibility, and will only be reversed on 
appeal if they are clearly erroneous. 
Southland Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320, 321 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
CONCLUSION 
Corbett and Gurr respectfully request this Court to 
affirm the trial court's decision and for attorneys' fees and 
costs of this appeal as provided in Rule 33(a) of the Rules of 
the Supreme Court. 
DATED this £?£? day of April 1989. 
JAI^aiNET^INEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
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